The Place of Political Science in the Philippine "New Society"

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The instituting of the "New Society" in the Philippines may be said to have transformed the political landscape of the Filipino nation. It marked the beginning of certain fundamental reforms in the social and political structure of Philippine society, such as the promulgation of a new constitution, the imposition of martial law, certain important economic reforms and, not the least in importance, the appearance of a new national ideology intended to enhance the feeling of common identity among Filipinos to create a new sense of social discipline, and so to consolidate the nation.[1]

The impact of the new reforms has been widespread, affecting all spheres of national life, including academic life. None of the academic disciplines have perhaps been more directly affected by these reforms than the social and political disciplines.

In this article, we shall consider the impact which the instituting of the New Society has had on the discipline of political science and on objective political inquiry. More broadly, our concern is the relevance of political science and of objective inquiry in politics under the new social order. This is a matter of serious concern, for it touches on the role which political science and objective political inquiry are likely to play, or can play, in Philippine national life today and in the future. Is such a role to be merely passive or can it be positive and constructive?

It is sometimes contended that with the old political reality gone, political science has lost the ground on which it flourished in the past. Or it has been contended that with martial law prevailing, there is no place for a free political inquiry, no place for free political

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[1]For an introduction to the ideology of the New Society, see Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos, *Today's Revolution: Democracy* (Manila, 1971).

science. Does this mean that the voice of political theorists has been reduced to silence? Has political science lost its independence as a scientific discipline? Has it found a new role for itself to play?

The writer freely admits that the answer which he gives to these questions is only one of many possible answers and that others may see this issue differently. Still, he is convinced that the article will have served its purpose if it provokes a controversy on the issue, for controversy could help us to clear the academic atmosphere, so to speak. It should help us to place the issues of political science and of free political inquiry in the Philippines today in proper perspective, by clarifying the scope, objectives and limitations under which they are expected to operate under prevailing political conditions.

The Old Society

The new status of political science can perhaps be appreciated best when we understand the status of the discipline under the "Old Society," as well as certain weaknesses that this position entailed.

The role and status of political science under the Old Society was shaped by the actuality of political life as it existed then, when politics is said to have been the master. It was derived from the highly politicized nature of Philippine life, from the overwhelming interest in practical politics. This interest generated a corresponding interest in political theorizing. In such theorizing the place of political science was central. Political science attained a new prominence because of its ability to teach the language of ideological thought, because it was believed to play an important role in awakening the political consciousness of the Filipino people. From a stuffy, ivory-tower discipline, it found a new, more noble role for itself. It turned into a living creed of men, an ideological instrument that was to pave the way for the impending transformation of the Filipino nation. Political science might have thus lost its academic innocence, but it gained a new popularity and affection.

There were, it seems, at least two major weaknesses from which the old political science suffered. The first was due exactly to its new ideological commitments. In this respect, the discipline may be charged with having become unduly politicized, a "committed science" rather than an objective discipline. In the hands of some academicians, it became but an instrument of ideological indoctrination, usually Marxist in flavor. Such commitments appear to have increased in 1972 with the rising expectation in many quarters of an

impending revolution. Thus, its scientific credibility appeared at stake. As one believer in objective political science saw it then, this period marked a serious "crisis of authority" in political science as an academic discipline.[2] The major point of criticism here was that academic freedom was explained as academic license, that prevailing freedom of inquiry was being used for ideological, partisan ends, and finally that the new ideologically committed advocates of political science were repressive of less ideology-oriented positions or simply of those who did not agree with their own peculiar views.

The second weakness of the old political science – as one sees it in retrospect – was its pro-Western orientation. Its model of political conduct was Western, mostly American. It showed no special interest in native political traditions nor in political mores of the neighboring Asian countries. In this, it failed to instruct the nation, simply following the prevailing interests and standards, whether of the dominant liberal variety or of revolutionary Marxism. Such failure is today widely regarded as a serious omission in the old political science. It was perhaps one of the causes that rendered the old society weak and unstable and led ultimately to its demise.

The picture of political science under the Old Society was, then, far from rosy. While on the one side there was undoubtedly freedom of inquiry, on the other side there was also repression of freedom and passionate political commitments, partisan feelings that affected deeply the scientific integrity of the discipline. Moreover, political imagination was active within a somewhat narrow area, tending to disregard both native and Asian political traditions and values.

Methodological Problem

The political commitments that the New Society demands from the Filipino people are said to be much greater, more encompassing, than commitments under the old social order. In the present section, we shall consider the question whether such commitments on the part of political scientists make an objective pursuit of political science impossible to achieve. This may be treated as an essentially methodological problem. Basically, the problem is whether, on today's principles of scientific methodology, the presence of value-preference or valuation (such as the kind involved in political commitment) is permissible in legitimate scientific inquiry.

[2]See, e.g., Remigio E. Agpalo, "The Crisis of Authority: The Political Scientist in the University of the Philippines," in the *Diliman Review,* Vol. XX (January, 1972).

The current tendency particularly in the methodology of social science[3] appears to be marked by tolerance of valuation. The ideal of the so-called positivist school dominant in the past, of a "pure" science, free from all value-elements, is increasingly recognized as impossible of attaining. Briefly, today's tendency to accept valuation as an element in scientific inquiry rests mainly on two grounds. The first is that some form of evaluation is logically unavoidable. As Gunnar Mydral, a renowned Swedish social scientist, has put it " 'a disinterested social science' has never existed and, for logical reasons, cannot exist."[4] Hutchison, an English theorist of economic science, is even more explicit, contending that valuation is unavoidable particularly in the initial stages of a scientific inquiry.[5] After all, we cannot start our social investigations with a *tabula rasa,* in a complete social vacuum. Moreover, we have to decide on the rules of procedure to follow, which we have to choose first. Also, we cannot help seeing our problem but through the eyes of certain established conventions, such as our personal cultural background or the prevailing categories of social and scientific thought.

The second ground for the current tendency to accept valuation in science is that valuation is on the whole beneficial to science. It has been contended that by concentrating only on bare "facts" we would be missing the social significance of many social facts. As Cohen has put it, "the contemplation of social ends enables us to see the relations of whole groups of facts to each other and to larger systems of which they are parts."[6] This is to say that, if our goal is a more comprehensive treatment of social problems, we should not try to separate sharply the description of social facts from the question of the social significance or desirability of such facts. Even more, it may be argued that it is exactly because of his special knowledge and skill in his field that the social scientist should be expected to give practical advice on the course of social policy. He should act as an active agent in national reconstruction; he should not shy away from social commitments.

[3]See the writer's article "The Limitations of Methodology in Social Science," in the *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* (October 1973) and his article "Ethics, Value-judgements and Economic Statements," in the *Ekonomi Journal,* Vol. II, No. 1 (1970), a University of Malaya publication.

[4]G. Myrdal, *Value in Social Theory,* ed. P. Streeten (London, Routledge and K. Paul, 1958), p. 1.

[5]See T. W. Hutchison, *'Positive' Economics and Policy Objectives* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1964), particularly p. 64.

[6]Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1953), p. 343.

Our brief review of current methodological tendencies in social science has revealed that scientific methodology is not necessarily hostile to personal ideological or political commitments. Mere commitment on his part to a particular ideological course need not by itself disqualify a social scientist *a priori* from acting within the boundaries of scientific legitimacy. What is important is that his beliefs should not unduly interfere with the scientific message that is conveyed. This, according to Myrdal, implies that the "hidden valuations" and "hidden assumptions" which the scientist makes should be revealed, that his basic assumptions and the starting point of his argument should be explicitly stated.[7] Furthermore, we must be able to distinguish scientific activity proper from common sense or propaganda writings. Here, the normal criteria of scientific validations, such as reproducibility, predictability, consensus of experts and Mill's principles of inductive logic must be observed. What applies to social science in general should apply to political science in particular. Strictly speaking, a political scientist *qua* scientist is committed to no peculiar political position but to science.

Descriptive and Theoretical Role

If our methodological argument above is acceptable, his commitment to the New Society need not necessarily disqualify the political scientist from acting as a scientist. Still, the question may be asked, what can he actually do to play a constructive role in the development of the nation? Is there some such role for him to play?

It may be convenient here to look at the new status and role of political science in terms of two types of inquiry that are logically different. The first type of inquiry is empirical or descriptive in character. It is political science dealing with "facts" of life, such as public institutions and political behavior of man. It may safely be predicted that in this respect the role of political science is not likely to change greatly from its former role. Thus, we may expect certain changes in the teaching curricula, such as in emphasis, some inclusions or exclusions, which reflect contemporary new tendencies and interests in politics and new alignments of political forces. For example, there may be a comparative diminution of interest in American government and institutions and a corresponding increase of interest in Asian governments and institutions. Still, these could not affect the traditional descriptive role of the discipline in any

[7] G. Myrdal, *Value in Social Theory,* ed. P. Streeten (London, Routledge and K. Paul, 1958).

substantive way. This relative permanence of a descriptive aspect of politics is understandable, for knowledge of facts about politics is useful whatever happens at home and is generally recognized as necessary intellectual equipment of all educated men.

It may indeed be contended that the advent of the New Society has had in many ways a beneficial and stimulating effect on descriptive political science, particularly as an academic discipline. The new orientation has opened new areas for exploration and so has injected a new vitality into the discipline. It obviously calls for an extension of political interest, gives a fresh opportunity for research, such as by throwing new light on national life in the area of domestic and regional politics, in aspects which were often disregarded by academicians in the past.

The second type of inquiry that characterizes political sciences is theoretical or speculative in character, dealing not so much with what "is" but with what "ought to be" in political life. This is the area of political studies where value judgments are most likely to be heard, where freedom for the objective pursuit of political theorizing is most in demand and most explicitly defended. Here, it seems, our relative optimism about the future of descriptive political science cannot be readily applied to political science as a theoretic discipline. The New Society has widely been charged with attempts to discourage, even repress, all original theoretic activity, with, showing a positive hostility to it.

The mentioned allegation is supported by at least two references. The first is the current regimentation of social life by an authoritarian government and the prevalence of martial law, which taken together effectively preclude all independent political theorizing from taking place. The second reference is made to the distrust of liberty that the leaders of the New Society appear to show in their public pronouncements. This is perhaps not surprising or unexpected, for the New Society claims to have originated as a reaction to "irresponsible" or unrestrained freedom under the Old Society. According to the new leaders, the "old" freedom led to social anarchy and fragmentation of national life and was, therefore, destructive of national unity and social stability. Hence they insist on "responsible" freedom, which is then reflected in their distrust of all free personal expression.

This is indeed a serious charge which, if true, would vastly reduce the value of political sciences as a constructive discipline. It would appear to imply the death of the discipline as a free scientific activity,

its stagnation on its theoretic side, even killing all original political thought. Even more, this charge, if true, would place the value of political experts themselves in question, for if "the chief professional role of students of government is most immediately linked with the functions of intelligence and appraisals,"[8] as perhaps most political scientists believe, such professional role could never be fulfilled in the absence of freedom necessary for the discharge of such functions.

Our references above indicate that there is much plausibility in the contention that the attitude of the New Society to theoretic political science involves an essentially negative position. Yet, on closer inspection, it seems that this is not the position which the leaders of the New Society themselves take, as they themselves see it. Both in their writings and public speeches, they openly profess allegiance to a democratic ideal of political life and to liberal values. Moreover the new constitution instituted under their guidance shows great concern for the rule of law and for the "rights of man." This should logically preclude all extreme attempts to sacrifice individual liberty such as to the cause of "national security."

It is submitted that for the leaders of the New Society the problem at issue in the political life of the country today is the problem that is perennial in all free societies, namely, where to strike the balance between two seemingly opposite aspects: how to bring into existence a well-ordered, progressive and stable society, and yet allow man to remain free. This was the familiar problem of Rousseau, the famous 18th century thinker: how to harmonize man's self-interest with his duty as a citizen, how to reconcile personal freedom with public authority. If this is also the aim of today's leaders in the Philippines, it is evident that the questions of individual freedom, of free expression, of free political inquiry cannot be disregarded as irrelevant to current Filipino political thought. They remain questions of vital importance to political life in the country even today. From our point of view, they are of crucial importance in our attempt to assess the role which political science will play as a theoretic discipline.

Free Political Inquiry

We have seen above that in the political atmosphere prevailing in the Philippines today individual freedom or freedom of inquiry is

[8]Harold D. Lasswell, *The Future of Political Science* (New York, Atherton Press, 1963), p. 26.

frequently distrusted; it is said to lead to social anarchy. Thus freedom appears on the defensive, in need of justification. In the present section, we shall try to provide at least a partial justification of freedom, namely, of freedom of objective inquiry in political science. We shall argue in favor of such freedom on the general grounds that it is likely to contribute to the advancement of society and that it is beneficial for the progress of science.

The first argument in support of free inquiry in political science is an extension of Mill's general argument for freedom of expression. Such free inquiry may be said to stimulate original thought, diversity of ideas and solutions to current problems and so contributes to the vitality of the discipline. This in turn should have beneficial effects on public life, keeping interest in public affairs alive, mitigating the prospect of stagnation or degeneration of political thought.

The second argument is based on the assumption that man is essentially a reflective and inquisitive being. If so, political inquiry is natural to man.[9] It should be natural for man to ask such questions as why one type of government is better than another, what the criteria are by which political systems may be judged in regard to their goals, method and achievements, why men should obey their rulers or, alternatively, under what conditions they need not regard themselves bound to obey. Now an objective inquiry in politics will give a deeper dimension to such natural interest of man. With its dispassionate scientific approach, it will allow a clearer, livelier perception of what political reality is all about, and so a more intelligent conduct of political life. In this respect political inquiry could have beneficial effects on the quality of public life.

The third argument concerns the need for free inquiry in politics to combat certain undesirable tendencies that are present in contemporary social science, including political science. Such tendencies as, for instance, methodological dogmatism, reduction of thinking to simplified ideological formulas, to *a priori* categories of thought, and uncritical workship of positivism in social science.[10] What is needed in science is (what Karl Popper has called) "openness," free discussion, scientific controversy, if our aim is to see our science preserve its liveliness and flourish. Likewise, an

[9]This suggestion was made by H. R. G. Greaves in his work *The Foundations of Political Theory,* second edition (London, G. Bell and Sons, 1966).

[10]Some of these tendencies have been identified in the writer's article "The Limitations of Methodology in Social Science," mentioned above.

"open" inquiry should be the best protection against dogmatism in politics and so most benefical to the advancement of politics as an objective discipline.

Democratic Theory

There is at least one more compelling reason why free inquiry in political science should be justified. The philosophy of the New Society simply appears to demand some such recognition. Its leaders profess allegiance to a liberal and democratic tradition of thought. If so, its theory of politics should be a democratic theory, which then appears to imply freedom of inquiry as one of its intrinsic principles or beliefs.

In the first place, the idea of freedom appears intrinsic in the liberal-democratic concept of shared responsibility. This is derived from the egalitarian and individualist assumptions of liberal democracy. Now democratic theory insists that such responsibility is not something that can be imposed from above, such as by governmental actions. It must be a free expression of each individual man himself. Democratic theory stands against all attempts at abdication of personal judgment, at denial of reflection and personal responsibility. It affirms the need for free self-development of each man. But such self-development is only possible when choice can be exercised. The idea of shared responsibility can thus become meaningful only when freedom of choice is allowed.

In the second place, freedom appears to be implied in the idea of democratic leadership. Democratic theory regards political leadership in the nature of trust, viewing leaders as mere agents of the people who elect them. It rejects monopolization of political power, dictatorial actions, the "inspired leadership" idea or the so-called hero interpretation of leadership as contrary to democratic values. This theory does not, of course, imply that the role of leadership should be weak or insignificant. It merely insists on the ultimate responsibility of leaders to the people. More specifically, it conceives leadership as a process of interaction, a sort of "two-way movement," with leaders having their own peculiar place to play in it, resting, as Greaves has expressed it, on "the ability of leaders, to convert the thoughts and feelings of the many into common purpose, to assist men to a consciousness that integrates their beliefs and activities both individually and socially." In the democratic concept of leadership, there is thus "on the one hand, leadership evoking response; and, on the other hand, the needs and experiences, and

their interpretation of beliefs, ideals and purposes, of men in society determining the conditions and limitations of that response."[11] Now it is clear that such democratic leadership can never be realized unless public opinion is allowed some degree of free expression.

Our argument above implies that there is no democratic theory without freedom and that since the New Society identifies itself with democratic theory it should profess freedom as one of its necessary components. A democratic theory and a complete ban on political freedom logically exclude one another. Also, extreme restrictions on freedom (such as under martial law in the Philippines today) can only be temporary, never permanent. This conclusion, of course, deeply affects the role of political science. It seems to follow that political science in a country professing democracy cannot limit itself to mere description of political life but that it must give expression to the diversity of people's political beliefs and ideals as well. Concretely, the discipline should regard itself as having a special theoretic role to perform, in the way of stimulating public opinion and advancing the cause of intelligent debate on public issues.

Academic Teaching and Research

In the following section, we shall try to identify some of the areas in which the New Society may have a stimulating impact on political science, in which the discipline can conceivably play a "constructive" role in Filipino nation-building.

One major development that the advent of the New Society may be expected to encourage is in the area of academic teaching. A new tendency appears present, away from narrow political interest, in the direction of treating public life in a broader, more diversified way, using more inter-disciplinary approaches. On this tendency, political experience is viewed not in isolation but is related more intimately to other aspects of human experience. In practical terms, this should lead, in our study of politics, to more emphasis on such diverse disciplines as, e.g., economic, statistics, Philippine history, social psychology, and on such issues as regionalism, problems of developing countries and up-to-date methodological approaches. This may also lead to less emphasis on theoretic knowledge, more on case studies, political practice and on contemporary perceptions in politics, particularly of the neighboring Asian countries. Such attempts at interrelating the various social disciplines were, of course,

[11]Greaves, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

not absent in the past. What is new today is a sense of urgency that fresh approaches in political studies are essential, appropriate to current Philippine conditions and aspirations.

Another development that may be expected is in the area of political research. With the advent of the New Society the possibility of research in new fields of politics has been extended. Obviously the new political reality demands that it be given appropriate conceptual expression and explanation. This should then stimulate creative and technical writings in all areas of social life, including political life. In practice this should mean, for example, the writing of new works whose aim is to project today's aspirations of Filipinos and to disengage teaching materials from their former intimate Western connections. Certain steps have already been taken in this respect by the educational authorities. Governmental institutions have encouraged domestic textbook writing and have given financial support to original research in various social disciplines.

Another area where the New Society will conceivably stimulate academic development is the area of institutionalized research. The overwhelming need of national reconstruction in the Philippines today is said to require concerted action by experts in different fields, a pooling of intellectual resources and experience. This is indeed, according to Harold Lasswell, the direction in which political studies are moving, at least on the American academic scene.[12] His proposal involves the establishment of a network of "institutes of advanced studies," in which scholars drawn from different social disciplines would work closely together. The idea behind such institutes is that the experts, living in relative seclusion, unharrased by exigencies of today's busy academic life, would have plenty of time to pursue the cause of improvement of the quality of social life.

It is submitted that some such idea may be also of value in the present-day Philippine situation, for the New Society professes great concern with rapid development of the nation and with improving the quality of people's life. Still, such institutions in the Philippines need not be exactly of the kind Harold Lasswell had in mind for his own American academic world. His American model institutions are perhaps too big, ultimately unrealistic, in the context of the more modest Philippine academic conditions. For one thing, the necessary manpower may be lacking. A more realistic plan, it seems, would involve the establishment of at least one such institution, perhaps

[12]See Harold D. Lasswell, *op. cit.*, Ch. 10.

closely connected with the State University, yet relatively autonomous both in its research and administrative activities.[13] An alternative idea might involve the use of an institution that is already in existence and merely expand its activities. The recently reactivated Philippine Political Science Association, if properly strengthened by generous public patronage, could conceivably serve some such purpose.[14] It could become the nucleus of the proposed advanced research institution, using the existing resources, adding merely to them. In addition, this *Journal* itself could play an important role in the proposed enterprise, acting as a forum of learned opinions, particularly for specialists in the area of political science.

A Constructive Theory

The New Society may also have a stimulating effect on political theory. One major area open to political theory is the area of the objectives and principles of the New Society, more generally the area of ultimate social ends. This should be of supreme importance to all Filipinos, for this touches directly on the question of the quality of life and human happiness. Are such objectives really worthy of our effort? Can we improve them? In this area, political theory can concern itself with the issue of the objectives that the New Society advocates, of the means for attaining such objectives, as well as with a critical evaluation of them. In this sense, Philippine political theory would follow the traditional Aristotelian path of dealing with political life in terms of its ultimate goal, of Aristotle's "Good Life." It would deal with social life as a whole, with questions of man's spiritual and material welfare, his ultimate happiness and his own status and function in the universal or national scheme of existence.

Another area open to theoretic inquiry, closely connected with the just mentioned inquiry, is the area of the concept of social justice. Since Plato's time this has been one of the fundamental concepts of social and political thought and is one of our great problems even today. In short, this involves the problem of how to organize Philippine society so as to make it a well-ordered, "just" society. This problem calls for a rational reflection on the social ideal of life and such issues as equality and inequality in the present

[13]It may be noted that an institute as proposed in this article was in fact opened recently at the University of the Philippines and is known as the "Philippine Center of Advanced Studies." This article was written about half a year before the establishment of the new center had been officially announced.

[14]This reactivation took place on September 29, 1973, at U.P. Diliman.

Philippine social context. Such a reflection should then enable us to discover or clarify the assumptions that underlie current Philippine social thought and actions. This in turn should help us to improve these. It may be added that our theoretic inquiry into social justice need not confine itself to mere abstract philosophic arguments. It may touch on concrete issues of national life as well. We may, for instance, relate justice to such real national problems as economic life, leadership, education or culture. Applied to economics, for example, the issue of social justice would provoke the intriguing question, what constitutes a proper or just distribution of wealth under the new Philippine social order. Indeed, social justice might come to be seen as the central principle in the current Philippine reconstruction, all other principles or values being only an application of it to different aspects of national life.

Theoretic inquiry may also play a constructive role in the area of liberal thought and values. Here the aim may be to reassess the status of liberal values in contemporary Philippine society. If liberalism of the old variety has failed (as the advocates of the New Society contend), what should the new liberalism be like? An answer to a question like this may necessitate a new formulation of such time-honored concepts as liberty and democracy, more in harmony with domestic needs. There is, however, also another good reason for our having a fresh look at liberal values. Liberal governments are said to be based on the idea of people's convenant and consent. Now with increased education, greater political consciousness and maturity may well be anticipated. This, in turn, is likely to lead to increasing demands for popular participation in public decisions. Under the presure of such new demands, some of the old notions of liberty and democracy may have to be revised or abandoned and new notions may have to be developed.

Limits of Political Inquiry

It remains to delineate the limits within which the "new" political science will be expected to move. We are interested in those limits that are not of merely temporary nature, but are likely to stay as long as the New Society persists. In brief, the New Society claims to disallow unrestrained freedom and absolute self-interest and to advocate common interest and other-regarding values. There is a tendency at present to repress unrestrained individualism and to encourage society-oriented attitudes. The New Society insists that all

future politics-motivated activity must be circumscribed by considerations of general public interest, as against private, personal interest. In the case of political science, this then presumably implies that the discipline should assume a heightened sense of social responsibility in its conduct of political inquiry, that it should become a "socially responsible" discipline.

It may be contended that such demands which the New Society makes for a "socially responsible" conduct or commitment to "public interest" poses grave dangers to the existence of political science as an autonomous discipline. As interpreted by the ideologues of the New Society, "public interest" may simply mean what they say it is. If so, then freedom of inquiry in political science may be circumscribed completely by the ideological demands that the New Society imposes. In effect, the student of politics may be permitted to indulge only in "constructive" criticism or in "constructive" theoretic activities, that is, those activities that reflect the prevailing (and officially advocated) ideological position.

Such dangers can, of course, never be excluded in a situation where one ideology tends to monopolize the political scene. Still, there are several reasons for believing that, under the New Society, political inquiry need not be restricted entirely, that the theorist of politics need not be deprived of all meaningful freedom. One such reason, we have mentioned above, is that the democratic assumptions of the New Society in principle preclude complete suppression of freedom. This should mean at least relative absence of rigid control by public authority in political writings or teaching and no deliberate manipulation of political materials to the extent that characterizes totalitarian regimes like Russia. Another reason is the relative flexibility of the ideology of the New Society. Unlike most modern ideologies, it does not appear narrowly chauvinist in its national goals, nor does it worship universal conformity, nor is it strictly totalitarian in its methods, i.e., concerned with manipulating all aspects of social life. It rather projects itself in terms of nondogmatic attitudes, of political realism, pragmatism, practicality. It appears motivated by practical concerns of national well-being and of economic growth rather than by some cosmic vision of the ultimate destiny of the nation. In this sense, then the New Society appears unlikely to interfere readily with political inquiry, unless a major challenge to its own legitimacy be at issue.

It is perhaps safe to suggest that, under the New Society, there are likely to be few restrictions in practice on free political inquiry

provided the students of politics adheres to the rule of the scientific game. He will be expected, that is, to present a balanced argument and to treat his subject in a detached, nonpartisan manner. As much as possible, he must allow facts to speak for themselves. He must not force his facts to suit some preconceived notions of personal or ideological rightness.

New Challenge and Tensions

Our inquiry into the place of political science in the Philippine "New Society" has led us to believe that this discipline may have a role to play that is not necessarily passive, and that is different from the role it played in the past. The advent of the New Society need not have killed the political imagination of the Filipino, rather, this imagination is being put to other uses. We have tried to indicate some of the areas in which the new role of political science may become realized and the new political imagination may find a fertile soil.

Still, what the discipline actually can do under the new political orientation cannot be determined with precision. This may depend largely on the practitioners of the discipline, on how they avail themselves of the opportunity that the new situation offers. The advent of the New Society may be regarded as a challenge to political science. If so, the success or failure of the discipline will partly depend on the nature of the response by the student of politics to such a challenge. On the one hand, he may, without losing his critical detachment, respond positively, such as by extending his understanding and interest to the new reality of life and actively cooperating with it, at least when the issue of national interest appears at stake. On the other hand, his response may be purely of the negative type. In the latter case, it may be contended that the very status of the discipline as an empirical science may be in question. A science that is out of sympathy with the world around itself tends to lose its "relevance" to the world, its vitality and progressive character. The great problem which the present challenge involves for political science is, then, chiefly the problem how this discipline may remain relevant to the times, constructive in its outlook, positive in its contribution to national development, yet preserve, at the same time, its status as an independent scientific discipline.

Our findings have also indicated the presence of a respectable area for free political inquiry. It seems that political inquiry will

remain free, unhindered by censorship or public control, at least so long as it confines itself to objective methods and follows normal procedures of science.

Some tensions or conflicts between the authority of the New Society and the discipline of political science may, of course, be anticipated, however careful the "new" political science may be to act within permissible limits. This is perhaps unavoidable and is not confined merely to the Philippine situation. This concerns the relation of the state with other autonomous units, which is a universal problem. A perfect reconciliation of the demands of the state with the demands for complete autonomy, whether for man or for science, appears impossible in our imperfect world, where human interests vary so greatly. This should apply also to the relations between the New Society and the discipline of political science.

It may indeed be contended that such perfect reconciliation is in principle undesirable and that conflicts or tensions may have a beneficial effect on social life. First, a "perfect reconciliation" of state and political science would more likely than not lead to a conformist discipline, in effect to the abdication by political science of its independent status. Second, conflicts and tensions may be regarded as an agent of progress (as such diverse thinkers as, e.g., Hegel, Marx and Dewey, tell us). New ideas and new discoveries are largely due to unrepressed curiosity, to "deviations" from "orthodox" norms or positions, and these are often accompanied by social and intellectual tensions. Yet without such deviations or some degree of tension these would have hardly materialized. Likewise, new ideas in politics may come out of tensions between state and political science, which may be of ultimate profit to both parties.

There is yet another good reason for regarding social tensions or conflicts as having a socially desirable effect. This has to do with democratic ideals of life, which the New Society also professes. Such ideals imply liberty, freedom of choice, recognition of differences among men, and diversity of opinion as something good in principle. These could hardly be realized without the possibility of some "dissent" or friction or conflict among men. So much was acknowledged even by Machiavelli, the classical advocate of political realism. As he saw it, social tensions or conflicts are the salt of a healthy life in a popular, republican system of government. They are not bad but positively good, for they mitigate the tendency toward political complacency, keep men alert to their interest, and so maintain the vitality of the nation. Thus they have invigorating

effects on political life; indeed, they are the very reason for the presence of liberty. It may likewise by argued that a certain degree of tension between state and political science may have salutary effects on democratic thought in the Philippines.

Conflicts or tensions between the New Society and the discipline of political science need not, then, be fatal to either party. What is wanted is that such tensions be minimized and that each party preserve relative independence.

Ideally, the relation between the New Society and our discipline would be in the nature of a dialogue that is "nonantagonistic" in character. It would be like what Jaspers called a "loving struggle" in his description of the relationship between man and the state. This struggle is intended not to destroy either party, but to stimulate both parties. Such a dialogue would, of course, have to be conducted within certain limits of propriety; otherwise mutual conflicts might become too extreme and ultimately unmanageable. Some such limits have been suggested in our previous argument. In this dialogue, the role of political science in the Philippine "New Society" would then be to take the lead in political controversy in its own peculiar academic way and, by reasoned argument, to advance the cause of political interest in the Philippine nation. In this, it would presumably remain everconscious of its broader responsibilities to Philippine society at large.